†a) , Student Member and Atsushi TANAKA †b) , Member SUMMARY Recent studies investigating the Internet topology reported that inter Autonomous System (AS) topology exhibits a power-law degree distribution which is known as the scale-free property. Although there are many models to generate scale-free topologies, no game theoretic approaches have been proposed yet. In this paper, we propose the new dynamic game theoretic model for the AS level Internet topology formation. Through numerical simulations, we show our process tends to give emergence of the topologies which have the scale-free property especially in the case of large decay parameters and large random link costs. The significance of our study is summarized as following three topics. Firstly, we show that scale-free topologies can also emerge from the game theoretic model. Secondly, we propose the new dynamic process of the network formation game for modeling a process of AS topology formation, and show that our model is appropriate in the micro and macro senses. In the micro sense, our topology formation process is appropriate because this represents competitive and distributed situation observed in the real AS level Internet topology formation process. In the macro sense, some of statistical properties of emergent topologies from our process are similar to those of which also observed in the real AS level Internet topology. Finally, we demonstrate the numerical simulations of our process which is deterministic variation of dynamic process of network formation game with transfers. This is also the new result in the field of the game theory.
Introduction
Recent studies investigating the Internet topology reported that inter Autonomous System (AS) topology exhibits a power-law degree distribution [1] which is known as the scale-free property. There are many models to generate scale-free topologies, for example the Barabási-Albert model [2] , the fitness model [3] , the threshold model [4] , and the node deactivation model [5] . However, no game theoretic approaches have been proposed yet to generate the scale-free topologies. The game theoretic approach seems to be efficient for modeling AS topology because it is generally constructed with a huge number of contracts between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as AS administrators, and these contracts are agreed by each of AS administrators behaving selfishly and decentrally.
The game theoretic approach is not only efficient for describing the AS topology, but also could be efficient for finding out how to redesign it better. This is because we could apply many results of mechanical design in game theory which are methods for designing games to make their results be desired ones.
There are two purposes in this paper. The first is proposing our new game theoretic model for AS topology formation, and showing that this model is appropriate for AS topology formation model because of the microscopic similarity of behaviors of the players. The second is showing that our model tends to generate topologies exhibiting scale-free property which is observed in AS topology, and showing that therefore this model is also appropriate for the AS topology formation in the macroscopic and a new candidate to generate topologies with scale-free property.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents basics on the network formation games established in the field of game theory. In Sect. 3, we describe details of the real AS topology formation, and point out some problems of previous network formation games in application to AS topology formation. In Sect. 4, we introduce our new model based on network formation games for modeling AS topology formation. The numerical simulations for our model and these results are described in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we discuss the results of the numerical simulations. In the last section, we describe conclusions and future works.
Basics on the Network Formation Games

The Static Network Formation Game
In this section, we introduce some results of the network formation game. Myerson [6] firstly suggested the game which represents the network formation, described as the link-announcement game [7] . In this paper, we refer to their model as the static network formation game to contrast it with the dynamic one described in the next subsection. It is formulated as follows.
Let N be the number of players, and they can form links among any pair of an agent. The topology (which is same as graph in the graph theory) g is defined by a combination of the set of agents N and the set of links L ⊂ N × N. Generally a link is represented as (i, j) ∈ L, for simplicity we denote it as i j. In this paper, we consider only undirected topologies. The strategy space of player i is S i = 2 N\{i} . If s ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n is the profile of strategies played, then link i j forms if and only if both j ∈ s i and i ∈ s j . The network g(s) that forms is represented by g(s) = {i j|i ∈ s j and j ∈ s i }.
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Jackson and Wolinsky [8] proposed the novel stability concept called pairwise stability which departs from the notion of Nash equilibrium because of specialty of the network formation game. An topology g is pairwise stable if
where u i (g) is the payoff for agent i in topology g and g + i j is the topology which is added a link i j to topology g, g − i j is the topology which is removed a link i j from topology g.
The former condition implies that no agents raise their payoffs by removing a link which they are directly involved in. The latter condition implies that no two agents can both benefit (at least one strictly) by adding a link between themselves.
They also proposed two concepts about efficiency, the strongly efficiency and the Pareto efficiency. For the former, a topology g is strongly efficient if
For the latter, a topology g is Pareto efficient if there does not exist any g ∈ G such that u i (g ) ≤ u i (g) for all i, with strict inequality for some i.
They investigated the relationship between pairwise stable topologies and each efficient topologies in the following distance-based utility,
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 indicates the decay of benefit from connected agent with increase of the distance, d i j is the distance between agent i and j (the number of hops from i to j), and c i j is a link cost to create or maintain the link between i and j.
There are two problems in this model. Firstly, it is difficult to find pairwise stable topologies because the space of solution is critically huge and no efficient methods to search pairwise stable topologies are found. Secondly, there are many pairwise stable topologies in general, and we can not identify important ones among these topologies. These problems are especially serious in the case that the number of players is large, and are caused by the stability conditions which require only that no changes occur in that topology.
Bloch and Jackson [9] suggested a simultaneous-move game in which players can offer direct transfers to one another to form links. It is formulated as follows.
Let each agent i announce a vector s i = (s i1 , . . . , s in ) ∈ R n (with s ii = 0) indicates the amount which i is willing to transfer to j to form a link, or, if this is negative number, the amount which i request in order to form the link. A link i j is formed if and only if s i j +s ji ≥ 0. In equilibrium this relation holds with equality. Let g(s) = {i j|s i j + s ji ≥ 0} denote the topology obtained by the network formation game with transfers. Player i's payoff π i (g) is then 
An improving path is a sequence of distinct topologies (g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g K ) such that each network g k with k < K is adjacent to and defeated by the subsequent topology g k+1 . It is clear that a topology is pairwise stable if and only if it is not defeated by any adjacent topologies. They showed that if no pairwise stable topologies exist then there must exists at least one improving cycle which is a improving path
They modeled the stochastic transition along the improving path. Let g t ∈ G denote the state (topology) at time step t (with t = 1, 2, . . .). At each time step, an agent pair (i, j) is randomly selected. If the current topology is defeated by the topology obtained by the change of the existence of a link among the pair, the change actually occurs at this time step and this is called the transition. They also introduce random mistakes of the decision which occurs in a small probability ε > 0. Note that the transition along the improving path is done by agents in a myopic sense. That is, at an each time step agents might intend to change a current state to a next one if only their payoffs of the next state are better than those of the current state, even if the change of state at this time step may lead another change at the next step which may cause worse payoffs for the agents who did the first transition.
Since each transition at any time step t depends only on the current state given by topology g t , this stochastic transition process is formulated as one of Markov chains. They showed that stochastically stable topologies of that process are either pairwise stable or part of a closed cycle.
The basin of a stable state or a improving cycle is the set of states which are defeated by the corresponding stable state or a part of the improving cycle. The size of a basin represents a stability of each stable state and cycle, and this is a important merit of the dynamic model. Carayol and Roux [11] simulated the dynamic stochastic model with their some modifications and investigated the structural properties of emergent topologies of their model. They concluded that for a large region of intermediate values of the parameter δ ∈ (0.35, 0.7), the emergent topologies have the small world properties which is characterized by both a high clustering coefficient C and a short average path length L. They also showed through their simulations that asymmetric distributions of link cost parameters c generates asymmetric degree distributions of emergent topologies.
Modeling of the AS Topology Formation
The Details of the Real AS Topology Formation
The AS topology is made by exchanging a number of routing messages advertised by the inter AS routing protocol BGP-4 [12] . Since the BGP-4 enables AS administrators to reflect their policy to routing control, these route information represents intentions of AS administrators. Exchanging route information with another AS means exchanging traffic to that AS. In practice, there are two kinds of routing information exchange. The one is called transit, that is a kind of routing information exchange with exchange of money. This kind of contract is made when there is a large difference between the amounts of traffic which will be exchanged through the contract. The other is called peering, that is a kind of routing information exchange without exchange of money. This is made when there is sufficiently small difference between the amounts of traffic.
Kawahara, et al. [13] reported the statistical properties of the real AS topology. The degree distribution almost obeys power-law with power index in the range of 2.2-2.5. The average path length and average (node) degrees are in the range of 3.6-3.9 and 3.4-4.2 respectively.
Some Problems of Previous Works
To apply these network formation games to the real AS topology formation, there are two problems. The one is the macroscopic problem that the emergent topologies generated by the simulations of Carayol and Roux [11] do not have the structural properties of scale-free characterized by the power-law degree distribution. The other is the microscopic problem that their model does not represent the real topology formation situations, in the sense of absence of the route information exchange with money exchange called as transit.
To construct the appropriate model for AS topology formation against these problems, it is necessary to introduce the concept of transfers to these previous models and to show the emergent topologies tend to have the scale-free property. However, these models have not been analyzed yet. In this paper, we propose the new deterministic dynamic process of network formation game with transfers and investigate what topologies tend to emerge through simulations of our model.
Proposal of Our New Model
In this section, we describe our model. In short, our model is a simple variation of the process of the network formation game with transfers based on the model of Bloch and Jackson [9] described in Sect. 2.1. We introduce the concept of defeat and improving path to their static model, and at the each time step, the link which is acceptable for both of involving agents and is the most cost improving after transfers is selected as the link to be changed at the transition.
The details of our process are game theoretically formulated as follows. Our process is a kind of the simultaneous-move game. At each discrete time step t, the game in strategic form determined by the current state g(t) is played and it determines the next state g(t + 1). As for the game which played at each time step, players are agents who intend to improve their payoffs. The set of the players is described as N and n indicates the size of N. The strategy of each agent i is indicated as a vector s i (t) = (s i1 (t), . . . , s in (t)
where τ i j (t) is the amount of transfer from i to j to form the link, this is paid out if the player i's benefit could cover the player j's deficit. The details for calculating the τ i j (t) are described in Appendix.
The outcome g(t + 1) obtained by playing the game at time step t differs no more than a single link from g(t). Let us define Δπ i j (t + 1) as the amount of change of i's payoff in the case that the change of link i j occurs at time step t. It is formulated as following,
The link i j which is changed at the game is
If there is more than one link satisfying this condition, the link which involved by the agent who have the youngest ID is prior than others as a matter of convenience. At each time step t, agents decide their strategies only to make their own payoffs of the next step t + 1 be better off without any forecasts. The process always starts from the initial state of empty topology g 0 = ∅, and it continues until the state converge at a stable state or a part of a cycle which is described as the solution of the process.
Here we explain some important properties of our process model, the simplicity, the determinacy and the limitation of abilities of agents.
Firstly, our dynamic process model is clearly much simpler than that of real AS topology formation, and more mechanical or heterogeneous models may be able to generate topologies which is close to the real AS topologies. However, a simple model gives us much more insights in the case the solutions of these models exhibit the same properties. Therefore, we investigate the condition to generate topologies which have the scale-free property by simulating our simple dynamic process.
Secondly, we describe about the determinacy. The following is the reason why we adopt the deterministic dynamic process as our model instead of stochastic one. In the previous stochastic models, a link which may change at each transition is randomly selected. Therefore the cases may tend to occur very often that no links change at the time step although there are cost improving links by changing the state of it. It is especially serious in the case that the number of agents is very large and the state converges to nearby some solutions, because in that case the number of cost improving links seems to be very few compared to that of the whole of links, therefore the probability of being selected a cost improving link is very little. This problem not only makes simulations of the model be difficult, but also is not game theoretic. Because, in that cases it happens that agents cannot select the best strategy at the time step although they should know that. By introducing deterministic transition rule for our model, we can avoid the problem. Furthermore, a state is pairwise stable with transfers if and only if no links change from the state at any time step in our dynamic process. Carayol and Roux [11] excluded cycles from solutions of their stochastic process, because they are caused by a recent error, and are rarely cases in their simulations. However, these solutions also represent stationary states after sufficiently long time steps, thus we treat both of them as solutions of the dynamic process. In our simulations we weight each of solutions to calculate the average properties of these solutions by a following way. For each stable states and cycles, each member of the cycle is weighted by the inverse number of length of the cycle. In the case of pairwise stable states, it is considered as a cycle of one length and is weighted by one. The state space G is divided into some mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive basins for each corresponding solution in our deterministic model, and the size of the basin represent a stability of the solution. However, in this paper we omit the discussions of the stability of solutions because of space limitations. Finally, we discuss the limitation of abilities of agents. In our dynamic process, each agents decide their strategies only to make their payoffs of the next step be better off without any forecasts. Furthermore, a state at each time step either transit to one of the adjacent states or fix at the same state. These assumptions do not represent any properties of real AS topology formation. However, the abilities for observation and calculation which agents must satisfy to behave rationally under these limitations seem not to be unnaturally exorbitance, thus we adopt these settings in this paper.
Numerical Simulations and the Results
In this section, we demonstrate some numerical simulations and show these results.
Firstly, we show the settings of our simulations. The number of agents is 100 because of the limitation of computing performance of the computer which simulations are ran on. This is very small number compared to that of the real AS which is participated by over 30,000 ASs. Although this number is not sufficient to simulate the real AS topology formation, we can investigate some properties of emergent topologies through the simulations on this settings. The simulations are ran for each decay parameter δ = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, which is fixed at all i j at the same simulation. The link cost parameters c i j are randomly sampled from several ranges of uniform distributions. The reason why we select the uniform distribution for link cost parameters is to investigate whether the scale-free topologies Table 3 The statistical properties of Erdös-Rényi's random graphs. . We investigate the average properties of emergent topologies by 100 sets of parameters sampled for each range. To investigate the effect of transfers, we execute two sets of simulations with and without transfers for each of these settings. Figure 1 and 2 show the degree distributions of each of emergent topologies generated without and with transfers respectively. Note that these graphs are double logarithmic charts. Similarly, Table 1 Figure 3 and Table 3 show degree distribution and statistical properties of Erdös-Rényi's random graphs [14] which have the average degree of 2.0, 3.0, . . . , 6.0 to compare it to results from our model. In each of these results, we show the average of values obtained by 100 simulations.
Discussions
For each of range of link costs, even for small δ the emergent topologies with transfers tend to make one huge component with all agents rather than those without transfers.
As for degree distributions without transfers, it tends to be similar to Poisson distribution rather than power-law distribution, especially in the case of small link cost. This characteristic is also observed in random graph. The number of agents which have only one link is about equal or smaller than that of agents which have two links. Furthermore, the degree of the maximal hub (the number of links of which have maximal links) is not extremely large compared with the number of agents, although there are agents which have some large number of links. This is because of the following reason. Suppose that a hub emerges from initial random process in the case without transfers. The benefit for peripheral agents of connecting to the hub becomes high, while that for the hub of connecting to them remains the same as before. That prevents the growth of the huge hub. In other words, there are no incentives for hubs to connect to other agents which have only one or two links. On the other hand, in the case with transfers, especially for small link costs, it tends to give emergence of topologies that have only one huge hub and other peripheral agents connected only to the maximal hub. Because in this case there are incentives for a hub obtained by peripheral agents through the transfers. In addition to that, when a hub emerges it tends to grow to only one extremely huge hub, because in our process adopt a most cost effective links as a changing link at each time step. It represents the property known as 'the rich gets richer'. For some large link costs, the degree distributions are similar to the power-law distribution with power index 2.3-2.4.
The average of clustering coefficient is abundantly smaller than not only that of the small world topologies by WS model [15] , but also that of Erdös-Rényi's random graphs in each case. This is caused by the distance based payoff function indicated in Eq. (1) . Especially in the case of large δ, an increase of benefit for an agent obtained by directly connecting agents which is short distance from a neighbor agent is very small, because it is already connected to that agents in short hops.
We also investigate the average number for averages degree of each emergent topologies. In the case that emergent topologies have only one component, it tends to be in about 3.0-6.0 in the case without transfers, while it tends to be nearby 2.0 in the case with transfers which is the minimal number to maintain only one component. The reason is same as that of degree distribution described above as the property of 'the rich gets richer. ' In the case of only one component, the average of averages of path length of topologies without transfers is slightly shorter than that of random graphs which have comparable average degree. On the other hand, in the case with transfers it is abundantly shorter than that of random graphs, and is the property observed in the scale-free topologies.
Next, we compare these results to real AS topologies described in the subsection 3.1. Among emergent topologies which have only one component, similar results to the real AS topology are those of on the setting of δ = 0.7, 0.9, c ∈ [0.0, 10.0) without transfers and δ = 0.9, c ∈ [0.0, 20.0) with transfers. The average of average degrees of the former is nearby that of real AS topologies, and is also near about that of average path lengths. However, these degree distributions seem to be nearby Poisson distribution. As for the latter, the degree distribution is power-law like and its power index is nearby that of real AS topologies. The power-law like distribution is observed in the case of the smaller δ. Furthermore, it has a similar value for average of average path lengths. However, the average of average degrees is clearly smaller than that of real AS topology.
Note that our simulation is computed with much smaller agents 100 compared with that of real AS topologies with about 30,000, thus it may be not accurate to compare two sets of topologies.
In summary, through our deterministic dynamic process of the network formation game with transfers, it tends to generate scale-free topologies especially for the case of large δ and large link cost c. As for the average of average degrees, it tends to have a smaller value than that of random graph.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the new dynamic game theoretic model as a deterministic dynamic process of network formation game with transfers for modeling the process of competitive and distributed topology formation like the AS level Internet topology formation. Through numerical simulation, we show our process tends to give emergence of the topologies which have the scale-free property especially in the case of large decay parameter and large random link costs.
The significance of our study is summarized as following three topics. Firstly, we show that scale-free topologies can also emerge from the game theoretic model. Secondly, we propose the new dynamic process of the network formation game for modeling a process of AS topology formation, and show that our model is appropriate in the micro and macro senses. In the micro sense, our topology formation process is appropriate because this represents competitive and distributed situation observed in the real AS level Internet topology formation process. In the macro sense, some of statistical properties of emergent topologies from our process is similar to those of which also observed in the real AS level Internet topology. Finally, we demonstrate the numerical simulations of our process which is deterministic variation of dynamic process of network formation game with transfers. This is also the new results in the field of the game theory.
There are some remaining future works. For modeling process of the real AS topology formation, it is important to execute additional numerical simulations for larger number of agents and compare their results with the real AS topology. At the game theoretic perspective, it seems to be important to investigate the properties of maximal consistent set [16] of our model analytically which is the solution set consisted of pairwise stable state and improving cycles. Furthermore, as described above in dynamic process the solution space is strictly divided into each basins which are respectively related to each stable states or closed cycles. It is also important to investigate the stability of each solution by evaluating the size of the basin.
